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ABSTRACT 
AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING BID OF INFANT-FORMULA 
MANUFACTURERS IN WIC REBATE AUCTIONS 
RAYMOND OPOKU 
2017 
This thesis investigates the factors that affect bid decisions of infant-formula 
manufacturers in WIC rebates auctions. Since its inception in 1972, the WIC program has 
served more than half of participating women and their infants each year. Today, Infant 
formula - the most expensive food item on the WIC menu - is accessible to all participants 
for free through the WIC rebate program. Through the rebate program, firms submit bids 
to solely supply their infant formula to a state WIC agency at a discount leading to fall in 
net prices. Yet, the firms in the infant formula market are selective in the auctions they 
submit bids for.  This study investigated the factors that influence firm’s decisions to bid 
as such the role of state demographics and market share in such decisions using cross 
sectional data spanning from 1986 to 2016 for analysis. The major findings of research 
include state alliance membership and firm’s market share are a primary factor when it 
comes to bidding decisions.  
 
 
 
Key words: WIC, Rebate Auctions, Infant formula, Alliances, market share, Sole source, 
Net prices, Wholesale Price
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE (1)  
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 Administered nationwide through local offices, the US Department of Agriculture’s 
(USDA) Special Supplementary Nutritional Program for Women, Infants and Children 
(WIC) is a federal government funded health and nutrition initiative for lower income to 
medium level-income women who may be pregnant, lactating or in postpartum, babies 
and/or kids mostly under five, who are at nutritional risk (NWA, 2011). It is the third 
largest federal intervention program after the Supplementary Nutritional Assistance 
Program (SNAP) and School Lunch program (Oliviera and Frazao,2009; Currie, 2003). 
The program is structured such that participants receive vouchers to have access to 
nutritional foods enlisted on the WIC menu of foods. The program offers educational 
information on the essentials of breastfeeding and its alternatives, health and nutritional 
support to its members.  
 Among the federal government’s most successful and cost-efficient intervention 
programs, WIC did not start until the 1960’s. At the time, low-income American families 
were falling short on the daily nutritional requirement and this drew concerns from both 
t1he federal government and the public. In September 1972, a two-year WIC pilot was 
begun (Ghefi, Olmested, Racine & Oliviera, 2002). The program was not in full flight 
until 1974 (USDA, 1999).  
 According to the Centre for Budget Policy and Priority the eligibility for the 
program is determined by incomes usually at or beneath the 185% poverty level set by 
the federal government level plus nutritional risk in at least one of the following 
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categories: 1) abnormal nutritional conditions (such as anaemia or underweight) 
detectable by anthropometric measurement (measurements of height and blood test for 
anaemia); 2) conditions that predispose towards inadequate nutritional intake; 3) 
nutritional medical conditions such as diabetes; 4) dietary deficiencies endangering health 
(Abrams, 1993). 
 The WIC program does not only cater for the need of breastfeeding mothers but 
also non-lactating mothers. Infant formula has become the highest priced food item on 
the WIC menu and as such is made available at a reduced price to WIC members. Though 
the program has enjoyed enormous praise for its effectiveness and efficiency in the 
improvement of the health of women and children nationwide, it has come under criticism 
for its most popular component - infant formula.  Scholars have argued that the free 
provision of infant formula has been the cause of the low breastfeeding rates among WIC 
mothers (Davis, 2011). 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
WIC which currently aids over 8 million women who are pregnant, or lactating mothers 
and young children under five, began over 40 years ago as a pilot program according to 
Review of WIC Food Packages in 2016. The program saw its implementation in 1972 
and has grown ever since (Betson, 2007). It currently serves more than half of the infants 
and more pregnant women in the US (Betson, 2007). In 2016, the WIC had an annual 
budget of about $6.6 billion.  
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  WIC is the United States’ attempt to reach the nation-wide nutritional policy target 
for majority of Americans; it is a support program aimed at providing the nutritional 
support to lower income to medium level-income women who may be pregnant, lactating 
or in postpartum, babies and/or kids mostly under five, who are at nutritional risk (Davis 
& Oliviera, 2015), (NWA, 2011). 
 The WIC program provides foods including milk, cereal, cheese, eggs, fruit juice, 
peanut butter and infant formula, among other foods. The program encourages and 
endorses breast-feeding as the best nutritional source for infants (Davis & Oliviera, 2015). 
Among the nutritional foods provided by the WIC program, infant formula remains the 
most expensive food item. According to Davis (2009), government agencies are the 
largest purchasers of the product. The United State Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
estimated that WIC procures about 57% to 68% of infant formula (Oliviera et al. 2010). 
In the past, the cost of infant formula placed a constraint on the annual congressional 
appropriations received by the program, making it difficult to serve all participants.  In 
view of the high cost of infant formula, WIC state agencies are mandated by law to run a 
cost-containment scheme for buying of infant formula (Davis & Oliviera, 2015) after its 
initiation and success in the states of Tennessee and Oregon.  
The cost-containment system is an auction-based process, where infant formula 
manufacturers compete through a sealed bid auction by offering rebates to become the 
WIC state agency’s sole supplier (Davis,2008). They receive the exclusive market rights 
to sell their product to the state WIC participants in return for giving the state a per-can 
rebate on infant formula sold through the program (Davis, 2008).  
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The higher the rebate offered, the lower the net price of the infant formula is. The 
firm with the lowest net price offer wins the sole-source contract.  
 
According to Carlson et. al. (2015), the WIC rebate process has been cost-
effective, and its competitive bidding process for purchasing infant formula is essential 
to its efficiency (Carlson et. al, 2015). The authors estimated that since the introduction 
of the WIC rebate program, WIC has been generating $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually 
in savings and with its annual federal appropriations serves 2 million more participants.  
 Without its cost containment system, WIC would have required more funding 
support from other sources to serve as many participants, or would run the risk of serving 
a smaller number of participants thereby hindering the achievement of nutritional goal. 
(Carlson et. al, 2015).  
Initially, infant-formula producers did not forcefully compete for WIC rebate 
contracts. Davis and Oliveira (2015) assessed various infant formula manufacturers bids 
for different State agency contracts granted from 2003 to 2013 and found that only three 
infant formula producers bid on rebate contracts throughout the period. As such 
manufacturers bid submission varied differently across the various contracts. The nature 
of this market makes it oligopolistic such that a few firms exist in a market with a large 
demand. There has been a huge gap between the real winning net price bid and the next 
closest competitor. Davis and Oliviera (2015) further suggested that infant formula 
producers forcefully competed during WIC auctions. The increase in these rebates 
recently was attributed to contracts receiving numerous bids, as well as an increase in 
contracts turn-over among manufacturers (Davis and Oliveira, 2015). 
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1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM  
Although bidding is entirely voluntary, infant formula manufacturers routinely 
compete aggressively on WIC contracts and offer substantial rebates.  According to the 
Centre on Budget and Policies priorities, $1.5 billion to $2 billion annual revenue rebate 
is generated from the nationwide competitive bidding. As a result, WIC’s cost is 
decreased considerably to the federal government in comparison to full retail value 
incurred by non-WIC members (CBPP, 2017). 
 In 2006, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report confirmed that a spill-
over influence by which the contract WIC brand becomes the favourite of both non-WIC 
customers and WIC customers could be a motivation to secure the WIC contract 
regardless of whether manufactures make losses selling to WIC. The GAO report in 2016 
further mentioned that the major infant formula producers agree to the importance of shelf 
space and product placement in marketing strategies. Many WIC agency directors who 
responded to a survey mentioned that they strongly agreed with the shelf space findings 
and that it was an essential factor when firm submitted bids (GAO, 2006).  
 Under WIC’s competitive bidding scheme, infant formula producers offer 
discounts- rebates to various state WIC programs in hopes to be chosen as that state’s 
sole infant formula supplier to all WIC members in the state (Carlson, Greenstien & 
Neuberger, 2017). Winning the WIC contract secures a manufacturer’s brand as the most 
readily available brand which receives favourable shelf space in stores.  When a producer 
wins a state’s WIC contract, non-WIC participants purchase more of that producer’s 
infant formula compared to their WIC counterparts (Huang and Perloff, 2007).  
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Davis (2009) found that, out of several auctions available at any given time, infant 
formula manufacturing firms do not all submit bids for these auctions. Firms are selective 
in the auctions in which they participate to maximizing their chances by strategically 
choosing the most promising ones. From Table 1.1 below it is observed that, with 172 
representing the number of auctions, Ross leads the chart with the highest number of 
submitted bids (166). Mead Johnson comes in second with 158 followed by Wyeth with 
a total of 79 and Carnation with 42. This inspires an interesting question as to why firms 
act this way in a purely oligopolistic market. This thesis seeks to examine factors 
influencing infant formula manufacturers’ decisions to bid in WIC rebate auctions and 
why firms aggressively contend for WIC contracts. 
Table 1. 1 Wholesale and Rebate Distribution of Firms in 2019 
 
Source:(Davis, 2009). All variables mean in dollars except Birth and WIC infants which 
are in thousands. 
In Table 1.1, it is observed that the means for rebates and wholesale prices in constant 
2007 dollars. Interestingly wholesale prices are almost the same for the largest firms, Ross 
and Mead Johnson as well as Carnation and Wyeth.  
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Economically important auctions are not isolated. Just as the "general 
equilibrium" tradition in economic theory has highlighted interrelations across markets 
in the economy, auctions take place in a larger context. Single, isolated auctions are easier 
to analyse. Rothkopf & Harstad (1994) suggested that models of isolated auctions may 
serve as useful building blocks, but the isolation can obscure important impacts. 
According to Rothkopf & Harstad, (1994), behaviours in auctions normally tend to be 
changed by the context of those auctions. The authors further stipulate that outcomes of 
such competitive bidding are affected by various economic relationships mainly alien to 
the market (Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). 
Bidding decisions can be complex and time consuming process and involve the 
utilization of a company´s resources. They also generate expenses that can be damaging 
for other company business areas (Buzby, 2002; Cova, Salle, & Vincent, 2000). 
On the other hand, decisions to bid or not to bid or the overall engagement in the 
tender process can be based on subjective evaluation and decision making (Ahmad, 
1990). To avoid situations where too many resources are used or where decision making 
is based only on a gut feeling, a pre-bid screening and analysis procedures can become a 
strategic tool (Cova et al., 2000). Garrett (2005) points out that an effective bidding 
decision making process is important to manufacturers for cost reduction and revenue 
generating reasons. 
Most of the research done on bidding decisions and the factors influencing the 
decisions concern the construction industry and huge contracts (Bagies & Fortune, 2006; 
Stark & Rothkopf, 1979). Nonetheless, effective bidding cannot be over emphasised in 
every industry as bad bids do affects firms’ resources.   
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The preceding works have identified factors important in the bidding decisions, 
however with large projects there is the need for highly secured financial power and 
minimal risk (Bagies & Fortune, 2006). For a manufacturing company the factors can 
differ as the number of tenders gets higher, the tenders get smaller and as such the 
relationship with the customer can influence the long-term decision making.  
 
Responding to all possible tender requests takes time and overloads the team 
working with tenders in several states. This may affect the quality of all bids and decrease 
the overall win rate of bids. The amount of effort put into the specification and estimation 
process can differ according to the customer request. The firm can choose to concentrate 
more efforts on larger in terms of volume, more profitable tenders (i.e. profit margin) and 
prepare a quick estimate with high margins for other tenders where later negotiations with 
the customer are expected (B. G. Kingsman, Hendry, L., Mercer, A., & de Souza, A., 
1996). However, the main goal of a manufacturing firm would be to concentrate efforts 
on bids that would be successful in the end and bring in customer orders and generate 
profit. As a part of the bid/no bid decision making the company could evaluate tenders 
according to the critical factors and identify auctions that are more likely to be successful. 
Therefore, the second objective of this study is to identify which factors are likely to 
predict the success of a bid in WIC industry in the USA. Based on this, the research 
question of thesis is: 
 
What factors influence the entry decisions of a bid of an infant-formula manufacturer in 
the WIC rebate auctions in the USA? 
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1. 3 GENERAL OBJECTIVES. 
The main objective of this study is to examine the factors influencing the bid decisions 
of infant formula manufacturers in WIC rebate auctions.  
1.4 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
Specifically, the study attempted: 
• to examine the factors influencing rebate bid decision-making by infant formula 
manufacturers. 
• to identify the relationship between a firm’s share of WIC market and a bid decision. 
1.5 STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The main objective of the study is to examine factors responsible for firms’ decision to 
bid in rebate auctions. Considering reviewed literature and the theoretical underpinnings; 
the following were the hypotheses were tested; 
𝐻0: There is no relationship between firm market share and bid decisions.  
𝐻0: There is no relationship between State Alliance and biding decisions. 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
This study should inform policymakers and practitioners in WIC markets on how best to 
operate infant formula contract auctions. Given the characteristics of the population 
represented in this study, results from this study can be generalized to other low income 
countries’ populations, where applicable.  
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1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to identify factors influencing rebate decision making 
by infant formula manufacturers in the U.S. A logistic regression model was used to 
establish the empirical relationship between bid decisions and market share. Other control 
variables believed to influence bid decisions were considered to infer the importance of 
profit in a firm’s behaviour. 
The source of data is secondary and cross-sectional time series (Panel Data) which 
was obtained from a compilation of losing and winning rebate bids from 1986 to 2016 
for thirteen-ounce cans of milk-based liquid concentrate (Davis, 2016). The data already 
have baseline demographic information about the WIC participants from all 50 states and 
D.C. 
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study has been divided into five chapters. Chapter one considers an 
introduction of this research with background of the study, problem statement, objectives 
of study, significance of the study, and statement of hypotheses and scope of research. 
Chapter two reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature available for the study. 
The literature review examines related articles to provide information in relation to this 
study to look for a better approach to this research. Chapter three discusses the 
methodology, and issues relating to analysis of data for the study. Chapter four specifies 
the model, analysis and presentation of empirical results. Finally, chapter five deals with 
the conclusions, policy implications, limitations of the study and directions for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO (2)  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2. 0 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. 
 Three years prior to the establishment of WIC in 1972, the United States 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the United States Department of 
Agriculture received reports of various ailments among young women, breastfeeding 
mothers, their infants and particularly pregnant women across the country who visited the 
hospital due to malnutrition, and the lack of food. These findings were alarming. In 1969, 
a recommendation from the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health 
prompted the government to take the nutritional needs of low-income pregnant and 
lactating mothers as well as their infants and children seriously (White House Conference 
on Food, Nutrition, and Health, 1970). 
 WIC established officially in 1972 by a congressional legislation (P. L. 92-433, was 
sponsored by the Senator Hubert Humphrey (D) of Minnesota) as a preliminary two-year 
pilot program. By the end of 1975, the program operated in 45 states expanding eligibility 
to include non-lactating women who were up to 6 months postpartum as well as children 
up to 5 years of age. It is currently the third largest federal food intervention initiative 
after Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or Food Stamps and The 
School Lunch program. 
 WIC foods are marketed through various retail outlets across the US where 
participants obtain food vouchers redeemable at state authorized retail stores.  
12 
 
The voucher system insulates them from the normal cost considerations, when buying 
nutritional supplementary items. According to Davis (2012), the Federal mandate 
demands quantities allowable which are written on food vouchers. The states reimburse 
all the retail stores for every food sold to WIC members based on their redeemable 
vouchers (Davis, 2012). 
WIC only provides specific food types to low income mothers and their young 
who may be lacking this food nutrition from their diets. WIC provides foods including 
whole-grain bread, infant formula, fruits and vegetables. Every now and then the USDA 
revises the WIC food list. According to Centre of Budget and Policy Priorities (2007), 
over 47,000 grocery stores nationwide received approval to accept WIC food vouchers 
based on their prices and the variety of foods offered (Centre of Budget and Policy 
Priorities, 2017) (Carlson, Greenstien & Neuberger, 2017). 
 In their address in 2015, Carlson and Neuberger provided an overview of the 
efficiency of the WIC program stating that WIC was cost-effective, and its competitive 
bidding process for purchasing infant formula was essential to its efficiency. Currently, 
federal regulations are specific on what WIC State agencies needed to operate a cost-
containment system for infant formula. They are required to make use a single-supplier 
competitive system unless an alternative system provides equal or greater savings (7 CFR 
246.16a). 
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2.1 PRISONER’S DILEMMA PROBLEM 
Betson (2007) argued that for infant formula suppliers, the rebate program has 
eroded an immense amount of profitability from the market. Before the sole source 
contract system was implemented, manufacturers enjoyed increasing revenues because 
infant formula prices kept increasing and input cost stayed the same. In its initial roll out, 
Betson (2007) identified that the government paid for consumer’s preferences of all WIC 
participants. The rebate initiative marked an end to this relationship as government 
demanded discounts for all their purchases (Betson,2007). 
The producers certainly were not happy with such an arrangement and fought the 
rebate system. Davis (2011) questioned what manufactures would do having been faced 
with in this sole source contract. Refusing to bid was their option which was not viable 
unless demand from WIC mothers was unmet. (Davis, 2011) 
All firms could not enter into a binding cooperative agreement not to bid due to 
federal legislation so that the government is forced to abandon the program all together. 
In the absence this consensus, each manufacturer had a short-term incentive of greatly 
profiting from each bid they submitted. This was where Wyeth (an infant-formula 
manufacturing firm owned by American Home Products) got its big breakthrough. 
  Wyeth owned a very small market share and would jump at such an opportunity to 
expand. After Wyeth submitted bids and won contracts, it did not take long for the others 
to participate. This is a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma problem in game theory. 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a situation where player can maximise their gains and optimize 
their strategy by observing strategies of other players or market participants. Betson 
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(2007) stresses that in the prisoner’s dilemma problem, while it is in the best interests of 
all firms not to bid, each manufacturer has a huge incentive to do so if they expect other 
firms to not bid.  
2.2 TRENDS IN INFANT FORMULA REBATE CONTRACTS 
 A s the largest buyer of infant formula in the United States, the federal government 
requires all WIC agencies to operate a system that reduce the cost of infant formula (Davis 
& Oliviera, 2015). According to Oliviera et al. (2013) and Davis and Oliviera (2015), 
usually State WIC agencies receive huge rebate discounts from the infant formula 
producers for every unit of formula bought through the initiative (Davis & Oliviera, 
2015). WIC contracts are awarded to the lowest net price offering manufacturer. The net 
price is the difference between the wholesale price and the rebate offered. A study 
conducted by the Economic Research Service based on a 2008 data identified that net 
prices kept rising, raising concern that this trend could constrain the WIC program’s 
ability to serve all participants. The study based on a February 2013 data allayed similar 
concerns (Oliveira et al. 2013). 
2.3 INFANT FORMULA PRICING 
 Prices of infant formula has generated contentions among various stakeholders over 
the years (Davis D. , 2014). Davis (2014) mentions that beginning in the 1990s, industry 
stakeholders had identified a rise in WIC participation as well as the price of infant 
formula. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO, 1998), after the rebate 
introduction, some industry players conjectured that the source of the huge rebates offered 
by manufacturers were results of higher prices at which the formula is sold to non-WIC 
participants (GAO, 1998). Oliveira et. al. (2004) revealed that the speculations in the 
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1990’s led the US Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights 
to launch an inquiry into the behaviour of formula producers at the time.  
2.5 REBATE SYSTEM 
The WIC rebate auction system has been very profitable to states’ WIC agencies, as the 
cost of procuring infant formula has declined (Davis D. , 2014). Producers are forced to 
sell unlikely below or near their cost of production limiting their profit gains. As such, 
producers yearn to subsidize their losses with increased revenues accrued from non-WIC 
participants. Davis (2014) argues that because the WIC contract brands become favourites 
of both WIC participants and non-WIC participants, manufactures are motivated to 
submit bids for contract regardless of whether they make losses. Davis (2014) terms this 
as the “spill-over effect”. A GAO report in 1998, revealed that recommendations of WIC 
brands to WIC participants by doctors to WIC mothers and the preference received by 
WIC brands in terms of retail store locations and shelf space were the two potential 
sources for a spill-over effect.  
Infant formula accounts for over 40 percent of the total cost of WIC food in the 
mid-1980s.  As the cost kept rising, it became harder for state agencies to serve women, 
infants, and children on program.  As such many participants were placed on waiting lists 
(Carlson, Greenstein, & Neuberger, 2017).  
 According to Carlson et. al. (2017), several state agencies adopted the competitive 
free market bidding approach to manage the cost by obtaining best deals on infant formula 
prices. Tennessee and Oregon were the pioneers of this initiative.  
The biggest players in this industry, Mead Johnson and Ross Laboratories, resisted 
the idea of a competitive bidding process. They both refrained from submitting bids when 
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the first state auctions were opened.  It took third and smaller producer, Wyeth, to submit 
and win bids in Tennessee to save the program. The Tennessee WIC agency ended up 
securing huge sums in savings. This success story drove other states to follow the 
competitive bidding process (Carlson, Greenstein, & Neuberger, 2017).  
2.6 REBATES AND PRICE OF INFANT FORMULA 
 Since the employment of rebate scheme, Oliveira, et. al. (2004) argues that the 
infant formula prices has risen consistently. The scheme left a few customers who are 
price sensitive to pay for formula, and producers in return charged higher retail prices. 
Davis (2004) identified in a multiple regression analysis and concluded that the rising 
retail prices increased as a brand wins the WIC contract and that retail prices rose with 
the size of the WIC market (Davis, 2004). 
 In contrast with Oliveira et.al (2014), a study conducted by the Centre for Budget 
Priority (CBPP) analysis of the US Department of Agriculture administration data, found 
that rebate discounts may have caused a decline in the cost of the WIC menu after 
controlling for inflation (Carlson, Greenstein, & Neuberger, 2017).   Between 1990 and 
2014, the cost of food sold to WIC participants rose half as much as the total cost of food 
ie. 45 percent versus 82 percent as shown in figure 1.1 below.  
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Figure 1. 1 WIC Food Cost Trend over time.  
Source: (CBPP Analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture Administration data, 
2016) 
 
 Betson (2009) developed a model that captures the behaviour of firms with regards 
to wholesale prices, WIC initiative and rebate auction. With the WIC initiative, because 
WIC mothers become perfectly inelastic customers, firms cannot ignore their behaviour 
when setting wholesale prices (Davis, 2014).  
 Davis (2014) further noted that one would expect WIC’s implementation to result 
in wholesale prices rising in comparison to an alternative situation without the program, 
but the difference in wholesale prices in both cases is unknown. 
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2.7 DECISION-MAKING IN BIDDING-PROCESSES 
 A great volume of literature has focused on bidding strategies and bidding decision 
making since Friedman (1956) introduced his mathematical model (Friedman, 1956; 
Skitmore, 2002). This led to the emergence of the school of research that has focused on 
mark-up decisions, and maximizing the expected profit from a tender (Parvar, Lowe, 
Emsley, & Duff, 2000). Another research stream has concentrated on the bid decision 
making processes (Ahmad, 1990; Paranka, 1971) and on factors that affect the bid/no bid 
decisions (Dulaimi & Shan, 2002; Lowe & Parvar, 2004; Shash, 1998) 
 As bidding strategies or mark-up decision are not the focuses of this thesis, the 
following paragraphs concentrate first on some of the studies describing the decision 
making in bid processes. This is followed by a selection of studies in which the factors 
that influence bid and no bid decision-making were identified. 
 Paranka (1971) defines the bidding strategy as including a pre-bidding analysis 
stage and a bidding determination stage. According to Paranka (1971), it is crucial first 
to evaluate the pay-off value of a bid opportunity before placing an actual bid. 
 According to Betson (2007), bids by the “big two” Mead Johnson and Ross Labs 
were as high as 117 sole source contracts from 1981 through 2002. In analysing rebates-
wholesale price relationship, Betson (2007) acknowledges the essential consequence of a 
theoretical model on which a manufactures’ rebate offers decisions are separated. If for 
some reason, according to Betson (2007), the manufacturer choses to increase their 
wholesale price by a dollar, rebate offers would rise by an equal dollar to keep net prices 
to the government same. Betson (2007) found wholesale prices statistically significant 
which confirmed his theoretical model’s result on the wholesale prices and rebates 
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relationships based on the bids submitted by the “big two”- Ross and Mead Johnson 
during the same period.  
 Betson (2007) again identified that forms of rebates offered in early solicitations 
were different from following ones, and that the difference in rebate discounts submitted 
by Mead Johnson and by Ross did not differ greatly.  
 Smaller states which are unable to secure similarly sized rebates as larger states 
group themselves into alliances in hope that as the alliances grow bigger they may attract 
equal rebates as larger states. The elasticities of the rebates submitted by both Mead 
Johnson and Ross were inelastic in nature i.e. a ten-percentage increase in the size of the 
contract yielded less than a percentage increase in the size of the rebate offered (Betson 
2007) statistically lending evidence to the claim of these small states. States that formed 
alliances obtained rebates that were statistically equivalent to stand alone states (Betson 
2007), (Davis, 2011).  
 Upon further investigation of the rebates bid in subsequent solicitations, Betson 
(2009) found that whoever held the current contract was a crucial element in determining 
the rebates offered by either Mead Johnson or Ross. In cases where smaller firms with a 
small market share (Wyeth and Carnation) held the current contract, Mead Johnson and 
Ross Labs submitted bids for the contract with rebates 3.3 percent higher than what they 
would have bid if one of them held the contract. Again, a 2.7 percent rebate lower than 
what they would have bid is offered by the other dominant firm not holding the contract. 
This behaviour according to Betson (2007) can be interpreted as a firm bidding to 
maintain their contract or not caring much about a major competitor (Betson, 2007).  
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2.9 WINNING BIDDERS’ MARGIN OF VICTORY  
 Davis and Oliviera (2015) postulated that in several instances, a winning net price 
bid offer diffed immensely from that of the closest competitor. In thirteen instances, the 
second lowest net price bid was twice as large as the winning bid. Davis and Oliviera 
(2015) referred to this net price gap as the “margin of victory”. Margins of victory 
according to Davis and Oliviera (2015) are essential as they are indicators of the auction 
outcome and eventually cost of the infant formula if the closest competitor had won. 
 Recently, the three major infant formula manufacturers have all submitted bids for 
every state or alliance WIC infant formula contracts. This means manufacturers valued 
many contracts differently and this is measured by the various net prices offered (Davis 
and Oliviera 2015). 
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CHAPTER THREE (3)  
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the model for the study. It mainly consists of the methods 
of study, the specification of the model, the estimation procedure and describes the 
process of the data analysis. 
3.1 RESEARCH METHOD  
There are several alternative methods for social science research. Numerous 
studies have employed panel data techniques, cross sectional and time-series methods 
examining bid/no bid decisions. However, the decision to apply any of the possible 
alternative methods for research depends on data, more variability and usefulness of 
research, and the objective of the approach in studying the effects of predictor variables 
on bid decisions.  
This research employs cross-sectional time-series data on WIC from 1986 to 
2016. To achieve the objectives of the study, the logistic regression econometric method 
is adopted for the data estimation and analysis using Stata software package. 
The data used in this research was secondary data drawn from 1986 to 2016. The 
data (Davis, 2016) include baseline information about the participants so there is no need 
to create a survey instrument.  
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3.2 SAMPLE DESIGN 
 The database was described by Davis (2016) and the data were obtained from 
different sources. A word of caution should be issued here as the data were gathered from 
different historical sources. Efforts were made by Davis (2016) to ensure its accuracy, 
however due to the minimalist information provided inaccuracies may still exist. 
The database was organized in a flat file format, and each row observation 
represented a US state, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and some Indian Tribal 
Organizations, and other territories were not included. 
Davis (2016) acknowledges that at the time of his writing, the database captured 
almost all thirteen-ounce milk-based liquid concentrate winning and losing rebate bids 
from 1987 to 2016. Both soy-based and mild-based liquid concentrate bids were used as 
they were available. 
Many state WIC agencies form some type of alliances to jointly contract with 
infant-formula manufacturers, which is included in the data as an indicator variable for 
whether a state stood alone or was a member of an alliance (Davis 2016).   
 
3.3 SOURCE OF DATA 
The study used existing sources as its basis. It is also made use of secondary data 
from which analysis was conducted to achieve the objective of the study. This is because 
the verification process is more rapid and the reliability of information and conclusion is 
greatly enhanced. The data contain several variables which were obtained from different 
sources. To appropriately consider all factors that through extensive research performed 
and the literature are believed to affect the bidding decisions by infant formula 
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manufacturers in rebate auctions, the following was done. In the initial selection of 
variables, factors that clearly demonstrated risk and decision to enter auctions were 
identified. 
 Other sources will include the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services (FNS). The 
choice of this period was informed by the availability of data for the variables of interest. 
The secondary data “was readily available and hence convenient to use’’ (Ghauri 
et al, 2002). Also, it provided enough information to test the hypothesis of this study.  
 
3.4 ESTIMATION PROCESS 
The maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was used to build the logit model to 
test the listed hypothesis. This enabled me to identify those variables which significantly 
impact bidding decisions. Stata software was used for data analysis. 
 
3.5 THE MODEL 
A logistic regression model below was used. Profit is one key motivation to bid 
in a WIC rebate auction. The response variable is Bid which takes on binary values of 
zero and one. A zero for no bid in WIC rebate auctions and one for the decision to place 
a bid in WIC rebate auctions. 
Logistic regression models are relatively simple but extremely powerful. Like 
linear regression models, the goal is to predict a dependent or target variable using 
various independent variables. The graph below compares how linear and logistic 
regression fit a binary target variable.  
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A Graph Comparing Logistic Vs. Linear Fit  
Source: (Thomas, Edelman, & Crook, 2002) 
 
Figure 3. 1 Comparison of Logistic and Linear Estimation 
Logistic regression accounts for the horizontal asymptotes in the binary 
distribution. Since the probability of an event is bounded by zero and one, logistic 
regression is more appropriate because it transforms the expected value of the dependent 
variable into a distribution with the correct range using the log-odds or logit function 
(Thomas, Edelman, & Crook, 2002). The logit function is simply the natural log of the 
odds, where the odds are the probability of an event divided by the complement of that 
probability.  
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3.5.1 BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
Let 𝑌𝑖 represent response variable, 𝑥𝑖 represent covariates, we get: 
𝑷(𝒀𝒊 = 𝟏)  = 𝝅𝒊 =
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊)
𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊)
   
          (1) 
 
The 𝛽,𝑠 in (1) represent parameters of the linearized generalized linear form 𝛽0 
representing the estimate on the average of the response variable if all other predictor 
variables are constant. 𝛽1 is the estimate of the response as a result of a unit change in a 
covariate holding all other variables constant.  
3.5.2 MULTIPLE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
We can extend the simple logistic regression model easily to more than one predictor 
variable.  
Let us define, 
 
 𝛽 = [
𝛽0
𝛽1
…
𝛽𝑝−1
]
𝑝×1
    𝑋 = [
1
𝑋1
…
𝑋𝑃−1
]
𝑃×1
   𝑋𝑖 = [
1
𝑥𝑖1
…
𝑥𝑖,𝑝−1
]
𝑝×1
 
we get, 
𝑿′𝜷 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝟏 + ⋯+ 𝜷𝒑−𝟏𝑿𝒑−𝟏                                                      (2) 
𝑿𝒊′𝜷 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊𝟏 + ⋯+ 𝜷𝒑−𝟏𝒙𝒊,𝒑−𝟏                                                         (3) 
So 
𝑬{𝒀𝒊} = 𝝅𝒊 =
𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝑿𝒊′𝜷)
𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝑿𝒊′𝜷)
 
  
           (4) 
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3.5.3 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD 
Recall that the joint probability function for binary logistic regression is: 
𝒈(𝒀𝟏, … , 𝒀𝒏) = ∏ 𝒇𝒊(𝒀𝒊) = ∏ 𝝅𝒊
𝒀𝒊𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 (𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊)
𝟏−𝒀𝒊𝒏
𝒊=𝟏     (5) 
 
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆𝒈(𝒀𝟏, … , 𝒀𝒏) = 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 ∏ 𝒇𝒊(𝒀𝒊) = 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 ∏ 𝝅𝒊
𝒀𝒊(𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊)
𝟏−𝒀𝒊𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏    (5b) 
 
= ∑ [𝒀𝒊𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆𝝅𝒊 + (𝟏 − 𝒀𝒊)𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆(𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊)]
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏      (5c) 
 
= ∑ [𝒀𝒊𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 (
𝝅𝒊
𝟏−𝝅𝒊
)] + ∑ 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆(𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊)
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏      (5d) 
 
Since 
𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊 =
𝟏
𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎+𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊)
 
           (6) 
and 
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆 (
𝝅𝒊
𝟏 − 𝝅𝒊
) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊 
          (6b) 
Therefore, 
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆𝑳(𝜷𝟎, , 𝜷𝟏) = ∑ 𝒀𝒊(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊) − ∑ 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆[𝟏 + 𝒆𝒙𝒑(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒊)]
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏     
(7) 
 
We are trying to find 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 to maximize the log-likelihood function: 
𝒍𝒏 = 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆𝑳(𝜷𝟎 , , 𝜷𝟏) = ∑ 𝒀𝒊(𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊) − ∑ 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒆
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 [𝟏 + 𝐞𝐱𝐩 (𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊)]
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏   
 (8) 
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Define: 
𝑈~
𝑦 = [
𝑦1
𝑦2
…
𝑦𝑁
]    𝑋𝑈 =
[
 
 
 
𝑋1
𝑇
𝑋2
𝑇
…
𝑋𝑁
𝑇]
 
 
 
 
    The model is 
𝒀 = 𝑿𝑻𝜷 
          (9) 
. The estimator of 𝜷 is 
?̂? = (𝑿𝑼
𝑻 ∑ 𝑿𝑼
−𝟏
𝑼
)−𝟏𝑿𝑼
𝑻 ∑ 𝒚𝑼
−𝟏
𝑼
 
          (9b) 
, where ∑ 𝒊𝒔𝒖  a diagonal matrix with 𝒊th diagonal element 𝝈𝒊
𝟐.  
To estimate the parameters (9b) for linear regression, least squares (9) 
approximation is used, and the explicit solutions for the estimates can be calculated. 
In logistic regression using least squares approximation usually does not result in 
an explicit solution for the estimates. Therefore, maximum likelihood estimation is 
used. Maximum likelihood estimation maximizes the likelihood function. Based on 
the data, the likelihood function calculates the probability that the parameters are 
correct. Thus, when the likelihood function is maximized, the probability that the 
parameters chosen are correct based on the modeling data is maximized (Faraway, 
2006). Since the dependent variable is binary, it is a Bernoulli random variable. 
The probability is evaluated by substituting the observed values of the independent 
variables into the equation.  
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3.6 TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATION OF RESULTS 
The estimation technique used for this research is a multivariate maximum 
likelihood estimation technique; specifically, the study employs a logit model. This nature 
of econometric analysis is used to determine the probability that an individual or entity 
with certain characteristics belongs or does not belong to a phenomenon under study. 
Logit models are binary classification models where the dependent variable is 
dichotomous and takes the value 0 or 1. In this analysis, I specify the dependent variables 
as 1 if firm bids in an auction (and zero otherwise). I therefore specify the logit models 
for bidding decisions as follows (8), (9) and (10). 
 
Let                                                
 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝑵𝒐 𝒃𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕         (10) 
𝝅 𝑩𝒊𝒅 =  𝒃𝒊𝒅 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕          (10b) 
𝑩𝒊𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅  > 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅          (10c) 
The firm bids in (10) if profit made is greater than a no bidding counterpart. The reverse 
occurs in (10b) below, where the firm has no incentive to bid should profit gained by 
doing so falls below a no bid counterpart. 
𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 𝒊𝒇 𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅  <  𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅        (11) 
𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 − 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 ≥ 𝟎 → 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝟏        (11b) 
The response variable Bid will take on the value 1 if the difference between bid profit and 
no bid profit is greater than zero (10c). If the difference is less than zero, the firm is less 
likely to submit a bid in the WIC rebate contract. 
𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 − 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅  < 𝟎 → 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝟎       (12) 
Specifying the logistic regression model from (10c) and (11) produces (12)  
𝝅𝑩𝒊𝒅 − 𝝅𝑵𝒐 𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝒇(𝑿′𝜷)        (12a) 
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𝑩𝒊𝒅 = 𝑬𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 =  𝒇(𝑿′𝜷)        (13) 
𝑓(𝑋′𝛽) 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
𝑷𝒓( 𝒚 = 𝟏|𝑿𝒊) =  
𝒆𝑿𝒊(𝜷𝟏−𝜷𝟐)
𝟏 + 𝒆𝑿𝒊(𝜷𝟏−𝜷𝟐)
 
          (14) 
𝑦 =  {
1       𝑖𝑓   𝜋𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝜋𝑁𝑜 𝐵𝑖𝑑 ≥ 0 → 𝐵𝑖𝑑 
 0    𝑖𝑓  𝜋𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝜋𝑁𝑜 𝐵𝑖𝑑 < 0 → 𝑁𝑜 𝐵𝑖𝑑
 
(15) 
Since the predictions can be either  or  i.e. binary choice (15). I assessed the 
model’s prediction power with Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and tested 
for Misspecification using the RESET Test. The estimated model takes the form; 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏( 𝐵𝑖𝑑 = 1) = 𝑓(𝛼 ,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑆𝑞𝑑, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚) 
The definitions of the variables in the model are shown below, which also offers several 
comments about their specification. 
 
3.7 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Bid: The response variable is a dummy variable for whether a firm bid or not. Since Bid 
decisions may be influenced by several factors, it is important to control for as many of 
these confounding factors as possible when analysing the bidding decisions by the firm. 
Therefore, the model included several independent variables to represent economic and 
WIC program factors thought to influence the bid decision of infant formula producers. 
These independent variables included market share, market share squared, State Alliance, 
Previous holder. 
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Share: All four firms have individual share of the WIC market.  The variable Share was 
calculated by dividing each firm’s annual infants by annual WIC infants and multiplying 
by 100.   
share2: share * share.   
State Alliance: Variable indicates whether a state is part of a multistate alliance or not. 1 
= Yes and 0 = No 
Previous Provider or Holder: This variable note whether a bidder held the state’s 
contract the previous time it was up for bid. 
Firm: Carnation (1), Mead Johnson (1), Ross (2), Wyeth (4) Firm dummy variable 
3.8 MODEL SPECIFICATION  
Log (
𝑃𝑖
1−𝑃𝑖
) = α + β1*MARKET_SHARE + β2* STATE_ALLIANCE + β4* 
PREVIOUS_PROVIDER + β5* MARKET_SHARE2 + β6*CARNATION + 
β7*MEADJOHNSON + β8*ROSS  
+ ε          (16) 
 
Where, α is a constant term, βn are the coefficients to be determined, and ε is the error 
term. 
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CHAPTER FOUR (4) 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4. 0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and evaluates the empirical estimation of the model.  The chapter 
also presents the results of hypotheses tests to know what influences infant formula 
manufactures’ bid decisions in the WIC Market.  
4. 1 STATE-ALLIANCE 
The essence of research depends largely on state – alliance features of the 
population. An essential understanding of the different alliance features of the states 
involved cannot be over-looked. Alliance refers to state agencies and offices that have 
joined together for a mutual benefit of purposely putting up auctions for competitive WIC 
bids.   
 
Figure 4. 1 SATE-ALLIANCE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION 
Source: Computed from Data (2008) using Tableau 
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From the figure 4.1 above is a figure I created to understand WIC-Multi-State Alliance 
memberships, it is observed that alliances change from year to year with others repeating 
or switching alliances all together. The numbers on the map represent state alliances over 
the years from 1987 to 2016. The colours represent the different alliances.  These alliances 
do not depend on the state size or geographic location. From the map, Texas and Minnesota 
regardless of their land size are a part of the same alliance.   
Table 4.0.1: Alliances Name and Their States Membership Over the Years 
Alliance Name Year States 
DC_DE_MD 1989 Maryland, DC and 
Delaware 
 AR_NM 1991 Arkansas and New Mexico 
NEW_ENG & Northwest 1991 Maine, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire 
The Western States 
Contracting Alliance.  
(WSCA1)  
1992 Alaska, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming 
TX_IA_MN 1992 Texas, Iowa and Minnesota   
IN_MI 1992 Indiana and Michigan 
DC_DE_MD_VI_WV 1993 District of Columbia, 
Delaware, and Maryland, 
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Virgin Islands and West 
Virginia 
NE_SD 1993 Nebraska and South Dakota 
TX_IA_MN1 1993 Texas, Iowa and Minnesota   
The Western States 
Contracting Alliance.  
(WSCA1) 
1993 Alaska, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming 
AR_NM_NC 1994 Arkansas, New Mexico and 
North Carolina   
NEATO_1 1994 Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire 
The Western States 
Contracting Alliance.  
(WSCA2) 
1995 Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, 
Wyoming 
TX_IA_MN1 1995 Texas, Iowa and Minnesota   
NEATO_1 1996 Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire 
NE_SD 1996 Nebraska and South Dakota 
IN_MI 1996 Indiana and Michigan 
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AR_NM_NC 1997 Arkansas, New Mexico and 
North Carolina   
Mid-Atlantic 1997 Maryland, Delaware, DC 
TX_IA_MN2 1998 Texas, Iowa and Minnesota   
The Western States 
Contracting Alliance.  
(WSCA2) 
1998 Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, 
Wyoming 
NE_SD_CHRV 1999 Nebraska, South Dakota 
and Cheyenne River Indian 
Reservation  
SW_Region(South West 
Region)  
1999 Oklahoma 
Mid Atlantic 1999 Maryland, Delaware, DC 
NEATO_1 1999 Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire 
AR_NM_NC 2000 Arkansas, New Mexico and 
North Carolina   
NEATO_1 2001 Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire 
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The Western States 
Contracting Alliance.  
(WSCA3) 
2001 Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, 
Maryland, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, DC and 
Wyoming 
NE_SD_CHRV 2002 Nebraska, South Dakota 
and Cheyenne River Indian 
Reservation 
TX_IA_MN2 2002 Texas, Iowa and Minnesota   
NE_SD_MO 2003 Nebraska, South Dakota 
and Missouri   
AR_NM_NC 2003 Arkansas, New Mexico and 
North Carolina   
SW_Region(South West 
Region) 
2003 Oklahoma 
NEATO_1 2004 Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire 
WSCA3 2004 Alaska, Arizona, Deleware, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, 
Maryland, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
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Washington, DC and 
Wyoming 
SW_Region(South West 
Region) 
2005 Oklahoma 
TX_IA_MN2 2005 Texas, Iowa and Minnesota   
AR_NM_NC 2006 Arkansas, New Mexico and 
North Carolina   
NEATO_1 2006 Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire 
The Western States 
Contracting Alliance.  
(WSCA4) 
2007 Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, 
Maryland, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming 
TX_IA_MN2 2007 Texas, Iowa and Minnesota   
SW_Region 2008 Oklahoma 
AR_NM_NC 2009 Arkansas, New Mexico and 
North Carolina   
NE_SD_MO 2009 Nebraska, South Dakota 
and Missouri   
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NEATO_2 2011 Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau.  
4.2 FIRMS 
From Table 4.1, it is observed that 32 percent of total sample size in the data are 
Mead Johnson and Ross respectively, and 24 percent of sample size is Carnation and 
Wyeth with 13 percent. The observations in the table represent the total number of bids 
the firms considered- both ones they submitted bids and ones they didn’t; a combination 
of bid and no bid auctions for each firm from 1987 to 2016.  
 Table 4. 1 Summary Statistics of Firm Bids 
 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm  Counts Percent 
Carnation 283 24.00 
Mead Johnson 372 31.55 
Ross 372 31.55 
Wyeth 152 12.89 
Total 1179 100 
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4. 3 FIRMS AND THEIR AUCTION COUNTS 
From Table 4.2, it is observed that, Mead Johnson has a total of 144 wins i.e. 46% of 
auctions. Ross follows in second place with a total of 35% auction wins. Carnation has won 
15% of total auction and Wyeth with a total of 5% auction wins.  
Table 4.2 Summary of Auction Winning Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA 
 
4. 4 FIRM WIC CONTRACT WINS AND THEIR SHARE OF INFANTS 
The Figure 4.3 shows contract winning firm and their share of all WIC infants on 
the average. The figure shows that Carnation has an average of 40% of all WIC infants. 
Mead John has the highest of 48% of all WIC infants, Ross follows with 40.3%. Wyeth 
has the least WIC alliance share of infants of 18%. This can be seen in the figure 4.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Frequency    Percent         
Carnation 46 14.56  
Mead Johnson 144  45.57  
Ross 109  34.49         
Wyeth 17  5.38 
Total 316  100  
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Figure 4.3: Firms and Average Share of WIC Market Over The Years.  
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA 
 
4.5 FIRMS AVERAGE WIC INFANTS UNDER CONTRACTS 
In Figure 4.3 below it is observed that a total of 34,717 infants average were under contract 
to Carnation and 40,321 total infants were under contract to Ross and Mead Johnson had a 
total of 46,455 under contracts as shown below in Figure 4.3 
Table 4. 3 Cross Tabulation of Firms and WIC Infants 
Firm Mean          Standard Deviation. Freq. 
Carnation 34716.691     28941.456 24 
Mead Johnson 46455.338    65453.943 84 
Ross 40321.373    45898.553 71 
Wyeth 25996.923    14194.142 13 
Total 41334.513    52732.906 192 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA 
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Figure 4. 4 Firms WIC Infants Over the Years 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA 
 
4. 5 BIDS WON BY FIRMS VERSUS NON-WINNING BIDS 
Table 4. 4 Cross Tabulation of Bid Firms Won Against Non–Winning Bids  
 
Firm 
Bid 
0 
 
1 
Total 
 
Carnation 149 134 283 
Mead Johnson 26 346 372 
Ross 20 352 372 
Wyeth 49 103 152 
Total 244 935 1179 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) STATA 
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From Table 4.4 above, it is observed that Carnation had a total of 283 auctions from 1987 
to 2006 in which to bid, with 149 no bids and 134 bids. Mead Johnson bids in 346 out of 
372 total auctions. Ross bids 352 out of 372 auctions. Wyeth bids 103 out of 152 total 
auctions. This is clearly observed in the chart below. Wyeth, Ross and Carnation all have 
85% probability of bidding and winning. Mead Johnson has about 90% probability of 
bidding. 
 
Figure 4. 5 Bid Distribution For Each Firms. 
  Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Stata  
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4. 6 STATE ALLIANCES AND THEIR BIDS BY COUNTS 
Table 4. 5 Cross Tabulation of State Alliances and Number of Bids Received By 
States. 
  Bid  
State Alliance 0 1 Total 
0 173 618 791  
1 71 317 388  
Total 244 935 1,179 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA 
From Table 4.5, it is observed that States who are not in any alliances receive 618 out of 
935 bids compared to states in alliances. It is also observed that Non-Alliance states 
receive more bids than alliance states.  
4. 7 FIRMS AND THEIR BIDDING TREND OVER TIME  
 
Figure 4. 6 Trend of Firms Annual bid distribution over Time 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau 
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The figure 4.6 above shows the number of bids annually by each of the firms. In 2012, it 
is observed that, Carnation, Mead Johnson, and Ross all places a total of 25 bids in various 
states. Mead Johnson and Ross may have increased their bid submissions to respond to 
the market competition from Carnation. This indicates that the number of auctions varies 
from year to year.  
4. 8 .1 FIRMS AND THEIR AVERAGE SHARE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Figure 4. 7 Firm and Their Average Annual WIC Share distribution over Time 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau 
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The figure 4.7 shows the average share of each firm over the years. Mead Johnson has 
the largest share in 2015 with an average share 42.5 percent followed by Carnation with 
an average of 37 percent and Ross with 20.6% of market share. 
4. 8. 2 STATES AND THEIR BID COUNTS 
 
Figure 4. 8 States and their Bid counts distribution over the years. 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using Tableau 
The chart above in figure 4.8 shows the states and the number of bids they record over 
the years under consideration. The highest recorded is New Mexico with 34 bids. 
Delaware, DC and Illinois received the lowest of 15 bids each. 
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Table 4. 6 A summary Table (for all variables in the model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean Standard 
Deviation 
minimum maximum 
Bid 372 0.9301 
 
  0.2553 
 
0 1 
Share 372 38.9565 18.8209       0 78.2282 
Share Squared 
State Alliance  
372 
    372 
1870.886 
.3252 
1501.657 
.4691 
0 
0 
6119.66 
1 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA 
The summary statistics above in Table 4.6 shows that, there are a maximum of 317,808 
a minimum of 17,860 and a mean of 37,283 total WIC infants’ participants from 1972 to 
2016. There is a maximum of 78% and a mean of 38% market share among all four firms.  
 
4. 9.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INFLUENCING INFANT 
FORMULA MANUFACTURERS BID OR NO BID DECISIONS. 
The focus of this study is to find the relationship between factors that affected 
bidding decisions of infant formula manufactures in WIC rebate auctions. In this section, 
the study presents the main findings from the logistic regression analysis and the logit 
model. Bidding decisions are hypothesized to be dependent on Market share, state 
alliance membership and Previous Contract holder. The results of the estimations 
conducted in this study are presented in Table 4.7 below.  
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At a one percent significant level, the result shows that a state in some alliances increases 
the probability of bidding. The odds of receiving a bid for an alliance state is 80% more 
likely than a non-alliance state. 
At one percent significance level, the result showed that for a unit increase in Market 
Shares we expect to see about 11% increase in the odds of submitting a bid holding all 
other variables constant. This implies that the greater the WIC market share, the higher 
the chances of bidding. The odds ratio measures the relationship between events and their 
occurrences. The odds represent the chances of an event outcome in the face of a 
circumstance or exposure in comparison to the same occurring outcome in the absence of 
the circumstance. In this study, the odds ratio captures a firm’s decision to bid in auction 
given other variables. My decision to make use of the odds ratio instead of the logit 
coefficient stems from the fact that, the logit coefficient will need to be exponentially 
transformed to mean anything. The odds ratio makes interpretation easier. The variables 
share and share2 were used as proxy for manufacturing capacity. As observed, an increase 
in the Share2 decreases the odds of bidding by 9%. The intuition behind this decrease is 
that, firms will only bid as much as their productive capacity could take beyond which 
their production and gains begins to decline as such the probability of bidding will 
decline.   
At one percent, significant level the result shows that Previous Contract holder has no 
significant effect on bidding decisions. This could because a previous holder of the 
contract does not affect the prices of infant formula in an auction year.  
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The results for the firms had a positive relationship with bidding decision with regards to 
the base firm Wyeth. Holding all other factors constant, Mead Johnson has higher odds 
of bidding by 2.9 times more than Wyeth. Ross odds of submitting a bid is 2.1 times more 
than Wyeth and Carnation’s odds of bidding is 0.3 times more likely than Wyeth. These 
are also shown in table 4.7. 
Table 4. 7. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OUTPUT OF ALL VARIABLES.  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Logit coefficients Odds ratio 
   
Bid   
   
State Alliance 0.589** 1.802** 
 (0.268) (0.482) 
Share 0.0967*** 1.101*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0236) 
share2 -0.000837** 0.999** 
 (0.000379) (0.000379) 
Previous Holder 0.104 1.110 
 (0.0758) (0.0841) 
1.Carnation -1.165*** 0.312*** 
 (0.277) (0.0864) 
2.Mead Johnson 0.720** 2.054** 
 (0.356) (0.732) 
3.Ross 1.046*** 2.846*** 
 (0.371) (1.055) 
Constant -0.686* 0.503* 
 (0.406) (0.204) 
   
Observations 756 756 
Standard errors in parentheses 
NOTE: All standard Errors are robust 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA 
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Log (
𝑃𝑖
1−𝑃𝑖
) = α + 1.10 (MARKET_SHARE) + 1.802*(STATE_ALLIANCE) + 1.110* 
(PREVIOUS_PROVIDER) + 0.999*(MARKET_SHARE2) +0.31*CARNATION + 
2.1*MEADJOHNSON + 2.8*ROSS (1) 
 
Table 4.8 Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables On Bid 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Marginal Effects. 
  
State Alliance 0.0682* 
 (0.22) 
Share 0.0112*** 
 (4.83) 
Share2 -0.000968*** 
 (-2.26) 
Previous Holder 0.0121 
 (1.38) 
Carnation -0.204*** 
 (-4.28) 
Mead Johnson 0.0856* 
 (2.02) 
Ross 0.114** 
 (2.02) 
Wyeth 0 
 (.) 
  
Observations 756 
t statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, * p<0.5 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA 
 
4. 9.1 PROBABILITIES OF FIRMS SUBMITTING BIDS. 
 The marginal effects above show that the change in probability for each relative bid 
relative to the base firm-Wyeth, Carnation is 20% more likely to bid than Wyeth, all other 
factors held constant. Ross is 11% more likely to bid than Wyeth, all other factors held 
constant. Mead Johnson is 8% more likely to bid, that Wyeth, all other factors held 
constant.  
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4. 9. 2 HYPOTHESES TESTING OF THE COEFFICIENTS OF BID 
𝐻0: There is no relationship between firm’s market share and bid decision.  
From the test conducted in the logit model, we reject the null hypothesis at a one per cent 
significance level. Thus, the coefficient of market share is statistically different from zero 
in the model. Hence, we conclude that market share has a significant influence on the bid 
decisions in WIC rebate auctions.  
PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF BID 
 
Figure 5.0 WIC Share and The Probability of Firms Submitting Bids 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA 
Figure 5.0 The Figure 5.0 above shows that the probability of bidding at various market 
shares. The probability of bidding peaks at about 60% market share. Beyond 60%, the 
probability of bidding decreases. The decline in bid probability might be attributed to 
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productive capacity being reached. As such, the firms are unable to meet the demand 
associated with extra bids and thus are less likely to bid.   
𝐻0: There is no relationship between state alliances and bid decisions.  
From the test conducted in the logit model, we reject the null hypothesis at a one per cent 
significance level. Thus, the coefficient of State alliance is statistically different from zero 
in the model. Hence, we conclude that State Alliance statistically has a significant 
influence on bid decisions in WIC rebate auctions. Being in a State alliance increases bids 
submitted by 60% more than if they are unaligned, holding all other factors constant and 
as such, bids increases with the alliances size. Dana (2012) identified it is not the size 
of buyers but the differences in buyers’ characteristics that influences the bargaining 
power of alliances.  
4. 9. 3 RESULTS FOR MODEL MISSPECIFICATION 
The logit model was tested for misspecification with a RESET statistic. If the model really 
is specified correctly, should I regress Bid on the prediction and the prediction squared, 
the prediction squared should have no explanatory power. This is observed as the 
prediction squared returned an insignificant p-value. 
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Table 4.9 RESET Test 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Bid 
  
Bid_Predicted .9454552*** 
 (.1462865) 
 
Bid_PredictedSquared .0248621 
 (0.44) 
 
Constant -0.014527  
 (0.1306236) 
  
Observations 756 
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA 
4. 9. 4 RESULTS FOR ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) Curve   
The Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve is a standard technique for summarizing the 
performance over some range of trade-offs between true positives (TP) and false positive 
(FP) error rates (Sweets, 1988). It plots the sensitivity (the ability of the model to predict 
and event correctly) versus specificity (a model’s ability to predict wrongly).  
The ROC curve is a graph that captures of specificity against sensitivity. According to 
Archer, K. J., and S. Lemeshow (2006) this is guaranteed to be a monotone non-decreasing 
function because the number of correctly predicted successes increases and the number of 
correctly predicted failures decreases as the classification cut-off decreases.  
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The area under the ROC curve is determined by integrating the curve. The vertices of the 
curve are determined by sorting the data according to the predicted index, and the integral 
is computed using the trapezoidal rule (Archer, K. J., & S. Lemeshow 2006). The area 
under the curve of approximately 0.8 indicates acceptable discrimination for the model. 
The area under the curve indicates predictive power of the model as shown in figure 5.1 
below.   
 
Figure 5.1 The ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) Curve   
Source: Computed from Data (2016) using STATA 
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CHAPTER FIVE (5) 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5. 0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of key findings of the study on bidding decisions in 
WIC rebate auctions. This is followed by the conclusions from the study and the possible 
recommendations for policymakers and future research. 
5. 1 SUMMARY 
This study examined the factors influencing bidding decisions by infant formula 
manufacturers in WIC rebate auctions. A logit model was used to estimate the model. 
 The study showed that the market share size of all firms influenced bidding 
decisions of these firms.  
 To achieve the specific objectives of the study, the stated hypotheses were tested; 
bid was regressed on market share and market shared squared holding other factors as 
other control variables. The independent variables showed that market share increases the 
probability of bidding among infant formula manufacturers up to about 60% market 
share. The hypothesis test shows that the coefficients of share is statistically different 
from zero. The study revealed the manufacturing firm will bid up to the point optimal 
capacity, beyond which their bid probability declines.  
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5. 2 CONCLUSIONS 
Market Share is revealed to have a positive effect on the bidding decision among 
Infant formula manufacturers in US. Thus, an increase in market share increases the 
probability of firms bid for WIC contracts. Carefully analysing the results of the effect of 
market share on firms bidding decisions in the US, it was found that an increase in market 
share increases the probability of firms bidding until a firm reaches about 60% market 
share holding all other factors constant.  
Further, the study showed that alliances membership of state affects the bids they 
receive. Some states size and previous contract holder may not be significant 
determinants of bidding decisions in infant formula manufacturing market.  
 
5. 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings and conclusions of this study, the following 
recommendations can be deduced: 
From the study, market share is essential to firms submitting bids for infant formula as a 
such efforts should be made by the federal government through policies to encourage the 
entry of more firms in the WIC market breaking the oligopoly that currently exits and 
reduce the market share held by the existing firms. The federal government has a role to 
play enacting policies towards enticing other firms into the industry.  
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5. 4 RESEARCH LIMITATION 
• Every research has some limitations. The first limitation associated with this study was 
data availability.  
• Another limitation was that some variables that would have also made meaningful 
explanations to the model may be ignored. Variables such as contract length and contract 
type could have explained the model but were ignored. This is because of inconsistency 
of results and time constraints. 
5. 5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 Based the limitations of this study, the following suggestions are made for future studies: 
a. Researchers can consider using dataset that has income and other demographics of WIC 
participant measured as a continuous variable. 
b. Researchers should also consider other variables including supply-side variables in 
estimating their bid model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ahmad, I. (1990). Decision-Support System for Modelling Bid No-Bid Decision Problem. 
 Journal of Construction Engineering and Management-Asce, 116(4), 595-608. Doi: 
 Doi 10.1061/(Asce)0733-9364(1990)116:4(595). 
Bagies, A., & Fortune, C. (2006). Bid/no bid decision modelling for construction projects. 
 Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Association of Researchers in 
 Construction Management Annual Conference, 4-6 September, Birmingham. 
Betson, D. Impact of the WIC Program on the Infant Formula Market, Contractor and Co-
 operator Report No. 51, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
 Service, January 2009. Available at: http://naldc.nal.usda.gov/catalog/32816 
 (accessed April 19, 2013) 
Betson, D., (2007), “Impact of the WIC Program on the Infant Formula Market,” USDA, 
 Economic Research Service, Contractor and Co-operator Report No. 51, January 
 2009, p. 74, http://naldc.nal.usda.gov/catalog/32816. 
Block, G., and Abrams, B. 1993. Vitamin and mineral status of women of childbearing 
 potential. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 678:244–254 
Buzby, C. M., Gerstenfeld, A., Voss, L.E, Zeng, A.Z. (2002). Using lean principles to 
 streamline the quotation process: a case study. Industrial Management & Data 
 Systems, 102(9), 513-520. doi: 10.1108/02635570210450190 
Carlson, S and Neuberger, Z., “WIC Works: Addressing the Nutrition and Health Needs of 
 Low-Income Families for 40 Years,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 
 2015, http://www.cbpp.org/wicworks. 
Cova, B., Salle, R., & Vincent, R. (2000). To bid or not to bid: screening the Whorcop 
 project. European Management Journal, 18(5), 551-560. Doi: 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0263-2373(00)00044-X 
Currie, J., (2003) U.S. food and nutrition programs. In: Moffitt, R. (Ed.), Means-tested 
 Transfer Programs in the U.S. NBER, Cambridge, MA.  
57 
 
David E. Davis, 2009. "Bidding for WIC infant formula contracts: Do non-WIC 
 customers subsidize WIC customers?," SDSU Working Papers in Progress 
 52009, South Dakota State University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2011 
Davis, D. & Oliveira, V., (2015) Manufacturers’ Bids for WIC Infant Formula Rebate  
  Contracts, 2003-2013, EIB-142, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic  
  Research Service, July 2015.  
Davis, D., 2008. "WIC Infant Formula Rebate Database: Description, Data, and State  
  Alliance Key," SDSU Working Papers in Progress 12008, South Dakota State  
  University, Department of Economics, revised May 2016. 
Friedman, L. (1956). A Competitive-Bidding Strategy. Operations Research, 4(1), 104-
 112. Doi: 10.2307/167522 
Garret, G. A., & Kipke, R. J. (2005). Bid/No-bid Decision-Making – Tools and Techniques. 
 Capture Management: Winning More Business: Cch Incorporated, Navigant 
 Consulting. 
Rothkopf M. & Harstad R, Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay. Source: 
 Management Science, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Mar. 1994), pp. 364-384 Published by: 
 INFORMS Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/   Accessed: 05-04-2016 20:13 UTC) 
Lowe, D. J., & Parvar, J. (2004). A logistic regression approach to modelling the 
 contractor's decision to bid. Construction Management and Economics, 22(6), 643-
 653. 
Oliviera, V, Racine, Elizabeth & Olmsted, Jennifer & Ghelfi, Linda M., 2002.  The WIC 
 Program: Background, Trends, And Issues”, Food Assistance and Nutrition 
 Research Reports 33847, USDA, ERS.  
Oliveira, V., E. Frazao, and D. Smallwood (2015)., Rising Infant Formula Costs to the 
 WIC Program:  Recent Trends in Rebates and Wholesale Prices, ERR-93, U.S. 
 Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, February2010. Available 
 at:http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-economic-researchreport/err93.aspx#. 
 UffkyKz8J8E (accessed January 17, 2016). 
58 
 
Oliveira, Victor, and Elizabeth Frazao. 2009. “The WIC Program: Background, Trends and 
 Economic Issues, 2009 Edition.” USDA Economic Research Service Report 73: 
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/ERR73/ERR73.pdf  
NWA (National WIC Association). 2011. Six steps to achieve breastfeeding goals for WIC 
 clinics.  http://www.nwica.org/sites/default/files/WIC_2011_SixStep_FINAL.pdf 
 (accessed August 10, 2015)  
Victor Oliveira, Mark Prell, David Smallwood, and Elizabeth Frazão, “WIC and the Retail 
 Price of Infant Formula,” USDA, Economic Research Service, FANRP-39-1, May 
 2004, p. 57,  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table 4. 2 CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
Source: Computed from Data (2008) using STATA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Bid  State 
Alliance 
share Share2 Previous 
Holder 
Firm 
Bid  1.000     
State Alliance 0.0414    1.000     
share 0.3997 0.1009 1.000    
Share2 0.3127 0.0814 0.9523 1.000      
Previous Holder 0.0175   -0.1184      -0.0653  -0.0440    1.000  
  Firm 0.2400 -0.0909 0.0324 -0.0200 0.0809    1.000 
59 
 
Figure 4. 2 Predictive Margins 
 
Source: Computed from Data (2008) using STATA 
 
 
 
 
  
